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ABSTRACT
Random selection of strategies greatly extends the opportunity to
develop optimum strategies for discrete two-person games. A consequence,
however, is that the payoffs received by the players can have probabili-
ty distributions, which complicates the determination of optimum strate-
gies. This problem can be greatly simplified by only considering some
reasonable type of "representative value" for a distribution. The ex-
pected-value approach uses the distribution mean. The distribution med-
ian is another reasonable possibility. For the common situation where
the players behave competitively, a form of game theory is developed by
applying the median approach to the payoffs for each player. This form
of median game theory has very desirable properties with respect to ef-
fort needed for application ands compared to expected-value game theory,
strong advantages with respect to generality of application. For exam-
ple, the payoffs can , be of a very general nature. A player has an opti-
mum strategy when the game is one player median competitive (OPMC) for
him. A game is median competitive when it is OPMC for both players.
Competitive games are an important subclass of median competitive games
wherein nondecreasing desirability of the payoffs for one player corres-
ponds to nonincreasing desirability of the payoffs to the other player.
This paper contains an introduction to median game theory and examples
of competitive ) OPMC for one player, and median competitive games.
*Research partially supported by Mobil Research and Development Corpora-
tion. Also associated with ONR Contract N00014-68-A-0515 and NASA Grant
NGR 44-007-028.
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INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION
Two players, each with choice among a finite number of strategies,
is the situation considered. Each player selects one of his strategies,
separately and independently of the choice made by the other player. A
pair of payoffs, one to each player, is associated with every possible
c:mbination of a strategy choice by each player. These pairs of payoffs
are the possible outcomes for the game. Statement of the possible pay-
offs to a player in matrix form is convenient, where the rows represent
i
his strategies and the columns the strategies of the other player. Both
of the payoff matrices are known to the two players.
A player is said to use a mixed strategy when he assigns probabili-
ties (sum to unity) to his possible strategies and randomly selects the
strategy to be used according to these probabilities. The payoff to
,
each player has a probability distribution (determined by the probabili-
ties that the players assign) when at least one player selects his stra-
tegy randomly. Knowledge of the probability distributions of the payoffs
is the maximum information that possibly can be obtained about the pay-
offs occurring for a game.
Determination of optimum mixed strategies is a basic problem of
game theory. That is, the problem is to optimally choose the probabili-
ties for the mixed strategies, where unit probabilities are possible.
Unfortunately, many complications cloud this choice when all the proper-
ties of distributions receive consideration. The problem is greatly
	 i
simplified, however, when consideration is limited to some kind of "rep-
resentative value" for a distribution. The distribution mean (expected
I-3-
payoff to the player) is used as the representative value in the well
established expected-value approach. Another reasonable way to repre-
sent a distribution of payoffs is by its median, and this is the basis
for median game theory.
One form of median game theory is that where the payoff matrices
are considered separately. The payoffs are ranked according to increas-
ing desirability within each matrix. and the situation is such that the
resulting rankings are the same for both players (that is  the players
are in agreement on the rankings). The median approach is applied to
the payoff for the players (with respect to the orderings). This form
of median game theory receives virtually all the consideration in this
paper. Another form, based on rankings of outcomes, is being developed.
However, all publications to date are concerned with rankings of payoffs.
A very desirable feature of median game theory is that the payoff
"values" can be of an exceedingly general nature. Some or all of the
payoffs need not even be numbers (for example, might designate categor-
ies). A ranking of payoffs, within a matrix should virtually always be
possible (for example, on a paired comparison basis). However
.
, the play-
ers are required to agree on the rankings.
The payoffs are required to be numbers (ordinarily expressed in the
same unit) for expected-value game theory. Moreover these numbers are
required to satisfy the arithmetical operations. This excludes for ex-
ample, the important situation where the payoff values in one or both
matrices are ranks.
Another very desirable feature of the median game theory considered
here concerns the necessity for accurate evaluation of payoffs. Know-
t
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ledge of the relative ranking within each matrix, combined with accurate-
ly determined "values" for at most two payoffs in each matrix (whose
locations are identified by the rankings) is sufficient for application.
Ordinarily, all the payoffs need to be accurately evaluated for expec-
ted-value game theory. The effort required for evaluating payoffs can
be a very important practical consideration (ref. 1). For example, sup-
pose that each player has 100 strategies, which is not unusually large
for meaningful practical situations. Then, the number of combinations
of strategies is 100,000. Obtaining enough information to rank 100,000
payoffs usually requires a small fraction of the effort needed to ac-
curately evaluate 100,000 payoffs.
An important class of games is that in which the players behave
competitively toward each other. Then, the concepts of a player acting 	 f{!
protectively, or vindictively, are helpful in determination of optimum
strategies (ref. 2). A protective player attempts to maximize the pay-
off he receives, regardless of the payoff to the other player. A vindic-
tive player tries to minimize the payoff to the other player, without
consideration of his own payoff. A (mixed) strategy whereby a player
can be simultaneously protective and vindictive is an optimum strategy
for him when the behavior is competitive.
The competitive viewpoint is adopted for the median game theory
based on rankings of payoffs. An optimum solution occurs for a player
if and only if the game is one-player-median-compettive (OPMC). A game
is median competitive if and only if it is OPMC for both players. Iden-
tification of OPMC games is considered in ref. 3. Special cases of med-
.	 t
-5-
ian competitive games (competitive games, or generated by a competitive
game) are identified in ref. 2. A game is competitive when its outcomes
can be arranged in sequence so that the payoffs to one player have non-
decreasing desirability and also the payoffs to the other player have
nonincreasing desirability.
The situation of competitive behavior also is that considered for
expected-value game theory (for example, see ref. 4). Optimum solutions,
of a minimax nature, occur for games that satisfy a zero-sum condition
(sum of payoffs is zero for all strategy combinations) or some mild mod-
ifications of this condition. Such games are a special case of competi-
tive games and a very small subclass of the median competitive games.
Thin, this median game theory has strong application advantages
over expected-value game theory, with respect to both generality of ap-
plication and effort required for application.
Some results for mc8ian game theory are stated in the next section.
This is followed by some examples of games that are competitive, gene-
rated by a competitive game, OPMC for one player only, and median com-
petitive but not generated by a competitive game.
SOME MEDIAN RESULTS
For simplicity in stating results the desirability of a payoff and
the "value" of a payoff are considered to be the same. The referenced
developments of results are stated in terms of payoff values, with
those values being numbers. However, it is easily seen that these re-
sults apply to situations where relative desirability can be determined
among the payoffs for each player (and also the players agree on the re-
sulting orderings).
i
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The players are called I and II and, for standardization, the pay-
off to player I is listed first in a game outcome. in all cases: there
is a largest value PI (PII ) in the payoff matrix for player I (II)
such that, when acting protectively, he can assure at least this payoff
with probability at least 1/2. Also, there is a smallest value PI (PI,I)
in the matrix for player I (II) such that vindictive player II (I) can
assure, with probability at least 1/2, that player I (II) receives at
most this payoff. The relations P' S P and P' S P hold, with equalityI	 I	 II	 II
possible. Detailed methods for determining PI , PII , Pi, PI I , also protec-
tive median optimum strategies and vindictive median optimum strategies,
are given in refs. 2 and 3 (with the method of ref. 3 usually being pre-
ferable). An outline of the method in ref. 3 is given in the Appendix.
Games occur such that a player can be simultaneously protective and
vindictive. This happens if and only if the game is OPMC for this play-
er. More specifically, let set I (II) be those outcomes where the pay-
off to player I (11) is at least PI (PII ) and also the payoff to play-
er II (I) is at most P
	 (PI). A game is OPMC for player I (II) if
II
and only if he can assure, with probability at least 1/2, that an out-
come of set I (II) occurs. To determine whether a game is OPMC for
player I (II), first mark the payoffs in his matrix that belong to the
outcomes of set I (II). Then form a new payoff matrix for player
I (II) by replacing the marked payoffs of his matrix with unity and the
unmarked payoffs with zero. Consider the resulting matrix of ones and
zeroes to be the payoff matrix for player I (II) in a zero-sum game with
an expected-value basis and solve for the value of the game to player
1
r-,-
I (II). The situation is OPMC for player I (II) if and only if this
game value is at least 1/2. When this is the case an optimum strategy
for player I (II) in solution of this zero-sum game is median optimum
for him. Some further discussion is given in the Appendix. A game is
median competitive if and only if it is OPMC for both playersa The
OPMC results are given in ref. 3.
For standardization purposes, a game is considered to be competitive
if and only if the totality of its outcomes can be arranged in a sequence
so that the payoff values for player I are nondecreasing and also the
payoff values to player II are nonincreasing. An important special case
is that where the payoffs to player I are strictly monotonic increasing
and simultaneously the payoffs to player II are strictly monotonic de-
creasing.
Now, consider some new material on OPMC games that is given in this
paper. An OPMC game for player I (II) is generated by a competitive
game when there exists a sequence arrangement of the totality of out-
comes such that: First, the payoffs of player I (II) in outcomes that,
in the sequence, are above (below) any outcome with payoff P
I (P II )
have values at least (most) equal to P I (PII ), and the payoffs in out-
comes below (above) any outcome with payoff P I (PII ) are at most (least)
equal to PI (PII ). Second, also the payoffs of player II (I) in out-
comes above (below) any outcome with payoff PI I (PI ) are at most (least)
equal to P I I (PI), and the payoffs in outcomes below (above) any out-
come with payoff P
II	 I II	 I
(P) are at least (most) equal to PI, 	 A
median competitive game is generated by a competitive game if and only
if it is OPMC generated by a competitive game for both players, which is
t
i
1	 '
1
1-
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a case considered in ref. 2.
Competitive games have desirable features when the possibility of
cooperation between the players is considered, and some of the median
competitive games that are generated by competitive games also have these
desirable features (ref. 5). In addition, interpretation of the impli-
cations of an optimum median solution is greatly simplified when the
game is competitive, and somewhat simplified when the median competitive
situation was generated by a competitive game. As will be seen from
the examples, a game that is OPMC for a player, or both players, is not
necessarily generated by a competitive game.
To summarize, for the form of median game theory considered, an op-
timum solution exists for a player if and only if the game is OPMC for
him. A procedure is outlined for determining whether a game is OPMC
for a player, and for determining a median optimum strategy when the
game is OPMC for him. Then, when player I (II) uses a median optimum
strategy, he assures with probability at least 1/2 that simultaneously
he receives at least P I ( PII ) and that the other player receives at
most P I (PI).
Finally, consider a possible extension to another form of median
game theory. Here, the outcomes are ranked, separately by each player,
and there need not be any agreement in these rankings. The median ap-
proach is applied to these rankings of outcomes. An advantage is almost
complete generality of application, with solutions for situations where
the players do not behave competitively (or only partially competitively).
A disadvantage is the substantial increase in the effort needed for ap-
plication. Often, all of the payoffs would need to be accurately
-9-
evaluated. A first step in the development of this form of game theory,
for competitive behavior, occurs in ref. 6. The procedure used in ref.
6 is to suitably supplement set I (II) with outcomes until •Lhe first
time player I (II) caii assure an outcome of his augmented set with pro-
bability at least 1/2.
EXAMPLES
To illustrate some of the aspects of median game theory, six exam-
ples of discrete two-person games are considered. Player I has five
strategies and player II has four strategies. For both players, the
possible payoffs are the numbers 1(1)20, where these could represent
ranks for one or both players.
The examples are selected so that in all cases P I = 13 and P II = 14.
When the game is OPMC for player I, the relation PI = 7 holds. When the
game is OPMC for player II, the relation P 	 8 holds. The Appendix
contains some discussion of cases where P I, P 	 PI I and median
optima:, solutions are readily determined. These considerations receive
direct use in obtaining the results that are stated in the following material.
An example of a competitive game occurs for the payoff matrices in
Table 1. The twenty possible outcomes can be arranged in sequence so
that the payoffs to player I are increasing and she payoffs to player II
are decreasing. A median optimum mixed strategy for player I is obtained
by assigning probability 1/2 to each of his strategies 2 and 3. For
player II, a median optimum strategy is obtained by assigning probability
1/2 to each of his strategies 1 and 2.
,1
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The game of Table 2 is generated by the game of Table 1. Here,
PI = 7 and PII = 8. The matrices uf. Table 2 are obtained by exchanging
payoffs within the matrices of Table 1 so that the conditions for gen-
eration of a median competitive game are satisfied. The median optimum
strategies for the game of Table 1 are also optimum for the game of
Table 2.
Table 3 contains a game that is OPMC for player I and, for him, is
generated from the competitive game of Table 1. That is, all payoffs
at least equal to P I = 13 for player I are paired with payoffs at most
equal to PII = 8 for player II. The game is not OPMC for player II in
any sense. Examination shows that P II = 14 and PI = 6. Let the outcomes
where the payoff is at least 14 to player II and also the payoff to
player I is at most 6 be marked it the matrix for player II. An out-
come of this marked set cannot be assured with probability at least 1/2
by player 11. As before, a median optimum strategy for player I consists
in randomly selecting one of his strategies 2 and 3 with equal probability.
The game of Table 4 is median competitive but is not generated by
any competitive game. First, consider markings in the payoff matrix for
player I of the outcomes w'-.are his payoff is at least P I = 13 and also
the payoff to player II is at most PI I = 8. An outcome of this marked
set can be assured with probability at least 1/2 and, as before, a med-
ian optimum strategy for player I is to randomly select one of his stra-
tegies 2 and 3 with equal probability. Second, consider markings in the
payoff matrix for player II of the outcomes where his payoff is at least
PII = 14 and also the payoff to player I is at most PI = 7. An outcome
^n4
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of this marked set can be assured with probability at least 1/2 and,
	 S
again, a median optimum strategy for player II is to randomly choose
one of his strategies 1 and 2 with equal probability. Finally the
	
a
game is not OPMC generated from a competitive game for player I or
player II. This follows from occurrence of the payoffs (18,10), (3,3),
(11,18), which could not be obtained through generation from a compe-
titive game when P I = 13, P 	 14, Pi = 7, PI I = 8. }
	
Next, consider the game of Table 5. For player II, this game is 	 :)
OPMC but not generated by a competitive game. The OPMC part for player
II is verified by marking in his matrix the positions of outcomes where
his payoff is at least P II = 14 and also the payoff to player I is at
most PI = 7. An outcome of this marked set can be assured with probab-
ility at least 1/2, and, as before, a median optimum strategy for player
II is to randomly select one of his strategies 1 and 2 with equal pro-
bability. The game is not OPMC generated from a competitive game for
player II, as is seen from occurrence of the outcomes (3 1 6) and (8,18).
Now consider player I. This game is not OPMC in any sense for player I.
Examination shows that P I = 13 and PI I
 = 7. In the matrix for player I,
let the outcomes be marked which are such that the payoff to player I is at
least 13 and also the payoff to player II is at most 8. An outcome of
this marked set cannot be assured with probability at least 1/2 by play-
er I.
Finally, consider the game of Table 6. This game is not OP14C, in
any sense.., for either player. First, consider player I. Examination
shows that P I = 13 and P 	 7. Let the outcomes where the payoff to
player I is at 'least 13 and also the payoff to player II is at most 7
s-12-
be marked in the payoff matrix for player I. An outcome of this marked
set cannot be assured with probability at least 1/2 by player I. Like-
wise, let a similar marking be done for player II I where PI = 8 and
PII = 14. Player II cannot assure an outcome of the marked set with
probability at least 1/2.
APPENDIX
Considered first is evaluation of P IS PII and determination of med-
ian optimum strategies for the case of players acting protectively.
This iG followed by an outline of a method to evaluate PI 1 P 1, and to
determine median optimum strategies for the case of players acting
vindictively. Finally, some very easily applied methods that often can
be used are presented. These methods are also usable for determining
whether a game is OPMC for a player and frequently yield a median opti-
mum strategy when the game is OPMC. The easily applied methods are ap-
plicable for all the examples that are considered. The results of this
Appendix are implied by the material of ref. 3.
For player I (II) acting protectively, first mark the position(s)
in his matrix of the largest payoff value. Then also mark the position(s)
of the next to largest payoff value. Continue this marking, according
to decreasing payoff value, until the first time that player I (II) can
assure a marked value with probability at least 1/2. Then P I (PII ) is
the payoff value associated with the last of the markings.
A general method for determining when a marked value can be assured
with probability at least 1/2 is obtained by a special use of zero-sum
expected-value game theory. Let a modified payoff matrix for player I (II)
1.
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be determined by replacing every marked payoff by unity and every unmarked
payoff by zero. Player I (II) can assure a marked payoff with probabil-
ity at least 1/2 if and only if the value of this game, to player I (II),
is at least 1/2. A protective median optimum strategy for player I (II)
is obtained as an optimum strategy for him in the solution of the zero-
sum game the first time that the game value is at least 1/2.
Another method, that is much more easily applied, is often usable.
Let the marking, according to decreasing payoff value, be continued until1
the first time that marks in all columns can be obtained from two or few-
er rows. Now examine the unmarked positions and suppose that "unmarks"
in all rows can be obtained from two or fewer columns. Then, for player
I (II), the value of PI (PII ) is the payoff value associated with the
last of the markings. If a fully marked row occurs, use of this row
provides a protective median optimum strategy. Otherwise, consider any
two rows that together have marks in all columns. Random selection of
one of these rows, with equal probability, furnishes a protective med-
ian optimum strategy.
For player I (II) acting vindictively, first mark the position(s)
in the matrix for player II (I) of the smallest payoff value. Then also
mark the position(s) of the next to smallest payoff value. Continue this
marking, according to increasing payoff value, until the first time that
player I (II) can assure a marked value with probability at least 1/2.
Then PI I ( P j ) is the payoff value associated with the last of the mark-
4
s
4
1	 .
i
ings.
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1
A general. method similar to that for the protective case can be used
to determine when a marked value in the matrix for player II (I) can be
assured by player I (II) with probability at least 1/2. A modified
payoff matrix for player II (I) is determined by replacing every marked
payoff by zero and every unmarked payoff by unity. Player I (II) can
assure a marked payoff with probability at least 1/2 if and only if the
value of this game, to player II (I), is at most 1/2.
Another more easily applied method is frequently usable. Let the
marking, according to increasing payoff value, be continued until the
first time that marks in all rows can be obtained from two or fewer col-
umns. Examine the unmarked positions and suppose that "unmarks" in all
columns can be obtained from two or fewer rows. Then, in the matrix for
player II (I), the value of P' 	 (P') is the payoff value associated
II	 I
with the last of the markings. If a fully marked column occurs in the
matrix for player II (I), vindictive player I (II) can use this col-
umn as a median optimum strategy. Otherwise, consider any two columns
that together have marks in all rows. Random selection of one of these
two columns, with equal probability, provides a vindictive median opti-
mum strategy.
Finally, consider an easily applied method of determining whether
a game is OPMC for a player and, of so, of determining a median opti-
mum strategy. This method is not generally applicable but often is usable.
It is similar to the easily applied methods stated for protective and
for vindictive players.
For player I (II) considered, mark the positions in his matrix
that correspond to the outcomes of set I (II). The game is OPMC for
Fe
-is-
this player if the marking is such that marks in all columns can be ob-
tained from two or fewer rows. If one row is fully marked, this row
provides a median optimum strategy for the player. Otherwise, for the
game OPMC to the player, consider the unmarked positions. Suppose that
"unmarks" in all rows can be obtained from two or fewer columns. Then,
for any two rows that have marks in all columns, a random selection of
one of these rows, with probability 1/2 for each row, provides a median
optimum strategy.
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